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Abstract
In the current media ecosystem, in which the traditional media coexists with new players who are able to produce informa-
tion and spread it widely, there is growing concern about the increasing prominence of fake news. Despite some significant
efforts to determine the effects of misinformation, the results are so far inconclusive. Previous research has sought to ana-
lyze how the public perceive the effects of disinformation. This article is set in this context, and its main objective is to
investigate users’ perception of fake news, as well as identify the criteria on which their recognition strategies are based.
The research pays particular attention to determining whether there are gender differences in the concern about the
effects of fake news, the degree of difficulty in detecting fake news and the most common topics it covers. The results are
based on the analysis of a representative survey of the Spanish population (N = 1,001) where participants were asked
about their relationship with fake news and their competence in determining the veracity of the information, and their
ability to identify false content were assessed. The findings show that men and women’s perception of difficulty in iden-
tifying fake news is similar, while women are more concerned than men about the pernicious effects of misinformation
on society. Gender differences are also found in the topics of the false information received. A greater proportion of men
receive false news on political issues, while women tend to more frequently receive fake news about celebrities.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between screens and their influence on
individuals has been further complicated by the emer-
gence of digital platforms. In the current media ecosys-
tem, in which the traditional media coexist alongside
new media and also new players who are capable of
producing information and spreading it widely, there is
a growing concern about the increasing prominence of
fake news. Despite some significant efforts to determine
the effects of disinformation, the results are inconclusive,
and there are many research gaps which have still to be
addressed (Tucker et al., 2018). More specifically, recent
research has addressed the consequences of exposure
to disinformation in different societal groups or individu-
als with diverse characteristics. For example, fake news
has been studied in relation to political beliefs or ideol-
ogy (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Guess, Nagler, & Tucker,
2019), news consumption or social media use (Wagner
& Boczkowski, 2019) or national feelings (Khaldarova
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& Pantti, 2016). Although studies of the reception of
fake news are still at an early stage (Jankowski, 2018),
we have identified a clear absence of a gender-based
approach to the topic. Issues of gender have been taken
into account in relation to fake news but normally from
a perspective based on the content or message analy-
sis (Stabile, Grant, Purohit, & Harris, 2019) or the strate-
gies of far-right groups in what has been defined as cul-
tural wars (Mudde, 2019). As will be further explained in
the literature review section, this article draws on recep-
tion studies on the dimension of gender differences in
news consumption (Fortunati, Deuze, & de Luca, 2014;
Toff & Palmer, 2019) as well as the previously identified
gender attitudinal differences with regard to the use of
new communication technologies (Bond, 2009; Cai, Fan,
&Du, 2017; Renau, Carbonell, &Oberst, 2012). From this
theoretical basis, this article aims to investigate whether
there are gender differences in the users’ perception of
fake news. More specifically, we will focus on several
issues which have already been researched in connec-
tion with fake news, but where the gender dimension
has been normally disregarded. These include concerns
about the spread of fake news, the degree of difficulty in
detecting it and the topics received.
Although authors likeWardle and Derakhshan (2017)
distinguish between misinformation, disinformation and
mal-information, and it is well known that the use of
the term ‘fake news’ is problematic, for the purpose
of this article we will use the terms disinformation and
fake news interchangeably, particularly in the results sec-
tion. Scholars tend to avoid using the term ‘fake news’
because they consider that it is inadequate to describe
the complex phenomena of false information (Tandoc,
Lim, & Ling, 2018). However, for ordinary people, fake
news is the most popular and frequently used expres-
sion to refer to the nebula of false information, viral lies,
conspiracy theories, and other forms of misleading infor-
mation spread on social networks and some newsmedia
(in Spanish, notícias falsas). Since the research is based
on a survey of a representative sample of the Spanish
population, we decided to use the most familiar word in
order to avoid misunderstanding.
2. Reception Studies, Disinformation and the Gender
Dimension
From a theoretical perspective, Audience Reception
Studies could help us to investigate individual’s percep-
tions and understanding of disinformation from a gen-
der perspective. Reception studies began in the 1980s as
a reaction to the widespread assumption that the audi-
ence was ‘passive’ in its media consumption, portray-
ing audiences as easy to manipulate and homogeneous
in their behavior and characteristics (Livingstone, 1998).
Reception studies implied a change in viewing audiences
as heterogeneous and resistant in their media consump-
tion. Hence, audiences were then defined both by their
personal characteristics aswell as by their social contexts
(Mattelart & Neveu, 2003). Since the 1980s reception
studies have evolved and adapted to an ever-changing
media system. Nowadays the new view of the audience
as ‘active’ is highly relevant, thanks to the possibilities
of the new communication technologies, which allow
greater user interactivity with media content (Banaji &
Buckingham, 2013; Jenkins, 2006; Jenkins & Carpentier,
2013; Scolari, 2012).
In principle, misleading content is not considered as
a gender-specific media product. However, rather than
conceptualizing audiences as passive consumers, or vic-
tims of this content, we suggest that we should concep-
tualize them as active in that they could challenge or
re-appropriate the content. In this sense, it would be rel-
evant to analyze whether gender plays a role in how indi-
viduals receive and react to fake news. Re-appropriation
must always be considered within the context of the
social situation in which it takes place as well as within
the routines of everyday life and personal characteris-
tics, which are so important at the beginning of the femi-
nist audience studies according to Cavalcante, Press, and
Sender (2017). Even before the digital hybrid media sys-
tem (Chadwick, 2013), audience research stresses the
importance of media consumption patterns in everyday
life (Bird, 2003; Morley, 1992) as well as the social and
relational roles in which this consumption takes place
(Boczkowski, 2010). The gender approach is very relevant
in these areas of research. Previous research showed sig-
nificant differences in how women and men find and
consume news, as well as the topics that most inter-
est them (Fortunati et al., 2014). It seems that women
may be more interested in news and reporting which
is directly related to daily life, such as the weather,
health and similar topics, and less interested in ‘hard’
political news (Poindexter & Harp, 2008). A ‘news con-
sumption gender gap’ has also been identified (Toff &
Palmer, 2019) that plays an important role in shaping
how women consume less news through patterns of
news avoidance, news-is-for-men perceptions and struc-
tural inequalities that shape individuals’ everyday media
consumption habits.
It seems then, that with regard to news’ consump-
tion, there are substantial differences between genders,
affecting which types of news are more or less con-
sumed by both women and men. Previous research
has addressed the issue of topics of disinformation,
but disregarded the gender differences. There is broad
agreement that disinformation has a strong political
component, linked to partisanship and identity poli-
tics (Mourão & Robertson, 2019). Hence, a high pro-
portion of fake news relates to such topics and narra-
tives. However, researchers have also found differences
between countries, with regard to specific national polit-
ical issues, divisions or media system characteristics. For
example, Humprecht (2019) found great differences in
comparing the US and UK with Germany and Austria.
While the former have a higher level of partisan-based
disinformation content, in German-speaking countries
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sensationalist stories are more prominent. Hence, disin-
formation mirrors national news agendas and political
debates. Furthermore, contextual events could alsomod-
ify which types of fake news are most frequently con-
sumed. For example, the outbreak of Covid-19 implied
that disinformation about health issues becamemore rel-
evant andwidespread, as recent research in Spain shows
(Masip et al., 2020; Salaverría et al., 2020). Despite these
interesting patterns, the gender aspect has not been fully
addressed. Hence, our first research question will be to
see if the previously identified ‘news consumption gen-
der gap’ can be extended to fake news reception:
RQ1: Are there gender differences in the perceptions
of the most common topics of fake news that are
received?
However, the ‘news consumption gender gap’ is not the
only gender bias found by previous research. As Cai et al.
(2017) point out, as regards the new communication
technologies, there still exists a gender attitudinal gap as
a consequence of many different factors, including the
general conception that technology is a male-dominated
area, that men are more competent users of technol-
ogy, and other social and cultural norms and factors.
This leads to many different relationships with digital
news content betweenmen and women. As Bond (2009)
highlights, the two genders exhibit different motivations
for engaging in social media use, a feature that can be
explained through behavioural patterns of socialization
(Renau et al., 2012). As Toff and Palmer (2019, p. 1565)
observe: “According to the theories of socialization, gen-
der roles and news consumption habits tend to originate
in the home and are reinforced and modeled in school,
among peers, and in the media.” As previous research
has emphasized, the approach to news media has gen-
der differences. This goes further than the gender pref-
erences on the volume, content and topics or theways to
find news, to the socialization processes, modeled from
childhood and reinforced by, among other agents, the
media system, and includes a structural inequality. This
structural difference seems to be more of a historical
constant than an anomaly and implies what has been
defined as ‘cognitive costs’: If we consider that women
are, in general, less educated, especially about political
matters, the ‘cognitive costs’ of deciphering and focus-
ing on politics might be higher (Benesch, 2012). Hence,
if media consumption and use of technology are so
strongly influenced by gender-related issues, we believe
that it is pertinent that audience researchers pay atten-
tion to the possible gender-basedmedia perceptionwith
regard to the criteria of trust in the digital field.
One interesting issue, therefore, is how these ‘cog-
nitive costs’ might relate firstly to the capacity of indi-
viduals to be concerned about disinformation, firstly,
and secondly to detecting this kind of content. Can we
talk about the different cognitive costs between women
and men regarding the capacity to detect fake news?
Does the lack of interest in political news make women
less likely to be worried about the spread of mislead-
ing content? Existing research on disinformation has
not fully addressed this a gender approach, with just
a few exceptions (Ştefăniţă, Corbu, & Buturoiu, 2018).
When researching fake news, it has been found that
individuals do not clearly distinguish such content from
news, although the results are better if they need to
identify propaganda or advertising (Nielsen & Graves,
2017). It seems that for many individuals, fake news
might be synonymous with ‘bad journalism.’ However, as
comparative results from the Digital News Report show
(Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen,
2018), individuals in many different countries (US, Spain,
Greece, Brazil, etc.) do recognize that they are frequently
exposed to disinformation although their interpretation
of what exactly this means might differ from academics
definition of it. With regard to individuals’ capacity to
detect disinformation, previous research has been based
mostly on cognitive perspectives in order to attempt to
distinguish which individuals are more likely to believe
fake news or to share this sort of content (Pennycook &
Rand, 2018; Schulz, Werner, & Müller, 2018). Although
results differ greatly depending on the country con-
cerned (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018; Humprecht,
Esser, & Van Aelst, 2020), there is a common ground
in most of them, defined in previous studies as the
‘third person effect’ (Jang & Kim, 2018). This means
the widespread belief that ‘other people’ are the ones
who are deceived by fake news rather than oneself or
those in one’s immediate circle. Age or digital literacy
skills are also often cited as predictors of how well or
badly individuals might be able to spot fake news, with
research often giving different or contradictory results
(Jones-Jang, Mortensen, & Liu, 2019; Pennycook & Rand,
2018; Wagner & Boczkowski, 2019).
Taking into consideration the findings of previous
research with regard to disinformation as well as the
current gap in addressing the gender approach, we
will frame our second and third research questions
as follows:
RQ2: Are there gender differences in concern about
the spread of fake news?
RQ3: Are there gender differences in the perceived
degree of difficulty in detecting fake news?
3. Methodology
The design of this research is based on a national sur-
vey on a sample of N = 1,001 Spaniards over 18 years
of age. The data were collected by a market research
firm (Gesop) through a questionnaire administered
online. The sample consisted of 1,001 completed
questionnaires, with the sampling stratified by age,
sex, autonomous community (Spain is divided into
17 autonomous communities) based on the actual
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distribution of the Spanish population. The margin of
sampling error is ± 3.2 with a 95% level of confidence
and p = q = 0.5. The fieldwork was carried out from
24–30 April 2019. Table 1 shows the demographics of
the participants.
To carry out the research, a broad questionnaire was
prepared with five main blocks: sociodemographic data,
media consumption, trust in the media, use of social
networks, disinformation and social networks. The ques-
tions were of two types: with multiple choice single
answer or multiple choice. Questions based on a Likert
scale (1–7, with 1 being none and 7 a lot) were used in
the questions asking participants for their assessment of
the proliferation of false news.
For the present investigation, the answers obtained
in the following questions have been taken into account:
i) Are you concerned about the spread of fake news?
ii) Is it difficult for you to identify fake news? iii) How
often do you check content you think could be false?
iv) What factors do you take into account to assess the
reliability of content received on social networks? and
v) Which are the most frequent topics of fake news you
receive? In addition, we take into account the gender of
the respondents and their self-reported use of social net-
working sites.
The results obtained in these questions were ana-
lyzedwith the student’s test statistic (bilateral), T-test, for
independent samples, Chi Square tests were used to ver-
ify the existence of dependency relationships between
variables. With regard to dependency, the standardized
residuals were analyzed. Finally, in those questions with
multiple answers, the results were analyzed by compar-
ing proportions for independent samples. The statistic
for the significance tests used was the Z (bilateral), in
pairwise comparisons. In all cases, the 95% confidence
interval level, which is used in the social sciences, has
been used.
4. Results
The results obtained show that Spanish people are very
concerned about the proliferation of fake news. On a
scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all concerned and
7 being very concerned, the mean obtained is 6.12
(x = 6.12, 𝜎 = 1.3). Women (x = 6.21, 𝜎 = 1.23) are sig-
nificantly more concerned than men (x = 6.03, 𝜎 = 1.36)
regarding fake news dissemination (see Table 2).
As Table 3 shows, differences in genderwith regard to
concern about fake news dissemination does not occur
among the youngest, (x = 6.06, 𝜎 = 1.36 in men Vs
x = 6.10, 𝜎 = 1.14 among women), nor among the older
age group (x= 6.18, 𝜎= 1.25 inmen Vs x= 6.21, 𝜎= 1.47
amongwomen). However, it is observed in the 30–59 age
range. Despite not being statistically significant it is inter-
esting to see that young men tend to show greater con-
cern than men between 30 and 59. Conversely, among
women, concern shows the opposite trend, increasing
when participants reach the 30–59 age range.
4.1. Social Media and Concern about Fake News
Regarding the analysis of concern about fake news,
respondents were divided into two groups, depending
on their responses on the Likert scale from1 to 7.We con-
sidered as ‘worried people’ those who responded 6 or 7
on the Likert scale, and the unconcerned as those who
rated it between 1 and 5.
The role of social networks as disseminators of disin-
formation could suggest a certain relationship between
their use and individuals’ level of concern about fake
news. However, it has been observed that the intensity
of use of social networks is not correlated with concern
about fake news. Only the frequent use of Facebook
𝜒2 (1, N = 791) = 5.25, p < .05 is associated with a
high degree of concern. This correlation is not observed
Table 1. Demographics.
Response N (%)
Gender Male 498 (49.7%)
Female 503 (50.3%)
Total 1,001 (100%)





Table 2. Concern about fake news dissemination.
1: Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7: Extremely Mean Standard deviation
Total 2.50% 0.80% 1.90% 3.70% 11.39% 26.87% 52.55% 6.12 1.3
Male 3.01% 0.80% 2.01% 4.42% 12.65% 27.51% 49.60% 6.03 1.36
Female 1.99% 0.80% 1.79% 2.98% 10.14% 26.24% 55.47% 6.21 1.23
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Table 3. Concern about fake news dissemination by gender and age.
19–29 30–59 60–74
M F M F M F
Mean 6.06 6.10 5.96 6.26 6.18 6.21
Standard deviation 1.36 1.14 1.42 1.15 1.25 1.47
T test 0.816 0.008 0.856
Notes: p = .05.
on Twitter and Instagram. The residue analysis confirms
the positive correlation between concern and daily use
of Facebook.
On analyzing the results obtained from individuals
who show higher levels of concern, we can observe
the dependency between gender and use of social net-
works.Womenwhoworry about fake news use Facebook
more frequently (𝜒2 (1, N = 630) = 13.75, p < .05) and
Instagram (𝜒2 (1, N = 424) = 4.37, p < .05) than worried
men; the men who express greater concern about disin-
formation use Twitter more intensively (𝜒2 (1, N = 334)
= 8.77, p < .05). The analysis of the standardized residu-
als confirms the results: Facebook: (z score = 3.708) and
Instagram (z score = 2.091) are used in a greater pro-
portion by women than men, who make more use of
Twitter (z score = 2.962). Among the respondents who
stated that they were not concerned, a correlation was
detected between daily use and gender in the case of
Facebook 𝜒2 (1, N = 161) = 4.59, p < .05; but not on
Instagram or Twitter. The specific analysis of the residu-
als shows thatwomenwho are not concerned about fake
news make more daily use of Facebook than men who
are not concerned (z score = 2.14).
Despite these results, it is risky to establish a causal
relationship between the two variables, since Facebook
𝜒2 (1, N = 791) = 19.53, p < .05 and Instagram 𝜒2
(1, N = 590) = 5.66, p < .05) are the social media sites
preferred by women, and Twitter (𝜒2 (1, N= 419)= 7.10,
p < .05) is the most popular social network among men.
In conclusion, the intensive use of one or other social
network by those who are concerned seems to relate to
factors other than fake news, since it reflects the nor-
mal behavior in consumption of social media at the gen-
der level.
4.2. Detecting Fake News
A majority of respondents (67.13%) admit to having
difficulties in detecting fake news. However, no signif-
icant differences can be established between genders
(x2 (2, N = 1,001) = 1.713, p .05).
Nevertheless, the analysis of the difficulty in identify-
ing fake news in relation to the concern for the spread-
ing of fake news allows us to verify the existence of a
correlation between the two variables. 76.8% of con-
cerned citizens report having difficulty in detecting fake
news, which drops to 63.58% among the least worried
about its dissemination. Therefore, there is a relationship
between concern about the proliferation of fake news
and the degree of difficulty in detecting it (𝜒2 (2, N= 998)
= 14.25, p < .05). We can also view it in reverse: Those
less concerned about fake news are the same people
who claim to have fewer difficulties in detecting it.
At the gender level, in line with previous results, no
behavioral differences between men and women were
detected. Differences by gender are not statistically sig-
nificant when it comes to identifying fake news based on
individuals’ concern about it. Women are more worried
than men, but both exhibit the same difficulty in detect-
ing fake news.
The study of trust and credibility is complex and
therefore, outside the scope of this article. However, it
is known that the tendency to consider a certain content
true or false is conditioned by what is accepted as true
(Williams, 2002). This is susceptible to change over time
and is conditioned by various antecedents and factors
such as the characteristics of the message, the sender
or the topics (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012).
Within this context, research participants were asked
what factors they take into account to assess the trust-
worthiness of the news received through social networks.
As it can be seen in Table 4, the source is the most impor-
tant factor for both men and women, although it is more
important for men (z score = 2,073).
If the degree of concern is taken into account, the
results follow a similar pattern. The most concerned par-
ticipants attach greater importance to the source of the
content—the author—(67.3%) than the less-concerned
people (53.7%), (z score = 3.6154). This behavior is
repeated in the analysis at the gender level (men con-
cerned vs. less concerned and women concerned vs.
less concerned). Among those who are most concerned,
there are no differences between men and women.
Greater concern about the spread of fake news could
be related to an increased need for verification. Analysis
of the data confirms this point. There is a correlation
between the degree of concern about fake news and
the frequency of checking it: 𝜒2 (3, N = 771) = 11.94,
p< .05. The most concerned check more frequently, and
the least concerned ‘almost never.’
Around 42% of those who are more concerned fre-
quently check (z score = 2.13), compared to 32.7% of
those less concerned, which results in statistically differ-
ent values (there is no overlap in the confidence inter-
vals). Those who are least concerned reported almost
never checking (20.1%), a statistically higher value than
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Table 4. Factors used to assess trustworthiness of news.
M F Total M (%) F (%) Total (%)**
Sharer (person who shared the content 251 270 521 50.40 54.00 52.20
Source (author of the content) 337 307 644 67.67* 61.40 64.53
Topic 175 191 366 35.14 38.20 36.67
Ideological affinity with the content 96 90 186 19.28 18.00 18.64
Format 154 149 303 30.92 29.80 30.36
Total 498 500 998
Notes: * = Statistical difference by gender at p = .05; ** =multi answer question.
10.6% of those concerned (z score = −3.22). This behav-
ior does not vary by gender.
4.3. Topics and Fake News
Lastly, an analysis was carried out onwhether therewere
gender differences with regard to the fake news topics
that the interviewees considered that they have received.
Politics is by far the most frequent topic, both among
men and women. Statistically significant differences are
observed as men receive fake news about politics more
frequently (z score = 2.02). There are no differences
regarding the other subjects, except in the case of sport,
which is much more frequent among men than among
women (z score = 1.96). Also, there are no differences in
the topics received in relation to the degree of concern
(see Table 5).
Respondents were asked to cite up to three topics
on which they believe they receive fake news most fre-
quently (Table 6). When analyzing the three responses,
politics remains the main topic, although does not show
any differences between genders. In contrast, national-
ism emerges as the second most common topic among
men (42.0%), a statistically higher percentage than
women (z score = 3.33). Politics, nationalism and immi-
gration are the most common topics for perceived fake
news. At a lower level of importance, news about celebri-
ties is also mentioned (29.4% of women vs. 22.1% of
men, z score = −2.64) and sport, significantly more
frequently among men than women (9.4% vs. 3.4%,
z score = 3.89). It was also observed that the degree of
concern does not have any relationship with the topic of
fake news received.
5. Conclusion and Discussion
The main aim of this article is to contribute to the lim-
ited existing literature on gender perceptions of fake
news. After reviewing the available research on recep-
tion, our starting point was to assume that individuals
are also ‘active’ in resisting fake news. Our intention
was to analyze whether identified gender differences in
news reception, as well as the cognitive costs associated
with gender issues in relation to news (Toff & Palmer,
2019) might have some translation into individuals’ per-
ceptions of fake news, and more specifically, with regard
to the spread of fake news, the degree of difficulty in
detecting it and topics of fake news received.
Our research shows that contrary to what one may
expect, there are few differences between genders with
regard to disinformation. While in other related mat-
ters such as social media use or news consumption,
gender differences have been clearly identified, the dif-
ferences are very subtle on disinformation. The main
point is that women are more concerned than men
regarding the spread of disinformation which is simi-
lar to what happens in other aspects of daily life (i.e.,
Xiao & McCright, 2012). However, women and men
have similar problems in detecting false content, they
use similar factors in assessing trustworthiness, and
they receive misleading material about the same topics,
mainly politics.
Table 5. Topics and fake news (first response).
M F Total M (%) F (%) Total (%)
Politics 197 167 364 39.56* 33.53 36.47
Immigration 46 64 110 9.24 12.85 11.02
Nationalism 44 39 83 8.84 7.83 8.32
Science and Technology 7 10 17 1.41 2.01 1.70
Feminism/Gender equality 28 25 53 5.62 5.02 5.31
Society**/Crime report 46 44 90 9.24 8.84 9.02
Sports 10 3 13 2.01* 0.60 1.30
Celebrities 31 46 77 6.22 9.24 7.72
DK/NO 89 102 191 17.87 20.48 19.14
Total 498 500 998 100.00 100.40 100.00
Notes: * = Statistical difference by gender at p = .05; ** = includes health, education, and the local news.
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Table 6. Topics and fake news (3 responses).
M F Total M (%) F (%) Total (%)**
Politics 334 316 650 67.1 63.2 65.1
Immigration 182 201 383 36.5 40.2 38.4
Nationalism 209 159 368 42.0* 31.8 36.9
Science and Tech. 38 33 71 7.6 6.6 7.1
Feminism/Gender equality 139 144 283 27.9 28.8 28.4
Society/Crime report 162 162 324 32.5 32.4 32.5
Sports 47 17 64 9.4* 3.4 6.4
Celebrities 110 147 257 22.1 29.4* 25.8
DK/NO 94 114 208 18.9 22.8 20.8
Total responses 1,221 1,179 2,400
Total sample 498 500 998
Notes: * = Statistical difference by gender at p = .05; ** =multi answer question.
RQ2 of this research aimed to determine the degree
of concern regarding disinformation in Spaniards and
whether there are gender differences. In this regard and
in line with other research (Eurobarometer, 2018), we
can affirm that fake news has become a concern for the
Spanish people, women more so than men. It is interest-
ing to observe that the degree of concern does not vary
according to gender for young people,which, as a hypoth-
esis and to be explored in future research, could be linked
to a higher educational level than previous generations.
The spread of disinformation is closely related to
social media use (Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2020), and its
use is also related to the degree of concern about the
spread of fake news. Our research reveals that Facebook
is largely perceived as the leading distributor of fake
news both by men and women. Only among the group
of the most concerned are any gender-related nuances
observed. While women claim that they receive fake
news through Facebook and Instagram, men believe it
reaches them predominantly through Twitter. However,
a causal relationship cannot be established, since various
studies clearly show that social networks in Spain show
gender differences in user distribution. While Facebook
and Instagram aremore female, Twitter is largely used by
men (We are social, 2020).
In the survey, participants were also asked if they had
difficulty distinguishing between false and true informa-
tion (RQ3). This is a complex issue to address insomuch as
it depends on individuals’ self-perception as being able
to identify false news. It is interesting to note how those
who are most concerned about fake news also perceive
the greatest difficulty in detecting it, which could suggest
that greater awareness of the problem leads to a greater
perception of difficulty of detection. Accordingly, those
with less concern see themselves as having less difficulty
in detecting it. Previous research has shown that individ-
uals have a tendency to consider that themedia, and also
disinformation, have a greater effect on others than on
themselves, in what previous research has identified as
the ‘third person effect’ (Jang & Kim, 2018). Interestingly,
our research shows that most respondents acknowledge
that they have problems distinguishing between false
and true content, and there are no significant gender
differences in this regard either. We do not disregard
the ‘third person effect,’ but we would like to empha-
size that, although individualsmay believe others are eas-
ier to trick, to some extent all of them perceive them-
selves to be vulnerable to fake news. This issue should
be addressed in further research.
As it has been seen, the credibility attached to a par-
ticular content is conditioned by multiple factors, relat-
ing to the message, to the psychological traits of individ-
uals, or even to the source of the content, which will be
subject to change over time and according to the con-
text. Our findings show that these factors apply to both
men and women in a very similar way. The only signifi-
cant gender difference relates to the source (the author
of the content), which is more relevant for men. In a clas-
sic communication context, this result could be linked to
the role that journalism/the media plays in the construc-
tion of reality, as well as the fact that men in Spain are
more extensive users of newsoutlets thanwomen (AIMC,
2020). However, in the current hybrid media system, the
role of the source goes far beyond the traditional media,
which share the stage with new actors, including possi-
ble creators and disseminators of false content such as
political parties, governments, defenders of conspiracy
theorists, etc.
This research allows us to identify two patterns of
behavior that go beyond gender: i) Concerned and active
users,who are genuinely concerned about fake news, are
more aware of the difficulty in detecting it and therefore,
make a greater effort to check the veracity of the news
they receive; and ii) confident and passive users,who feel
less concerned about false news, view is as less difficult
to detect and, therefore, they verify the content less and
take less account of the source. It would be interesting
to verify these typologies in other countries. This corre-
lation between concern and perception of difficulty in
detecting disinformation suggest a need to focus more
closely on fact-checking processes and results, and fos-
ter a questioning attitude towards news.
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Lastly, our RQ1 was to determine whether there are
gender differences in the most common topics of fake
news that are received. This reflection originates from
what previous research has named the ‘news consump-
tion gender gap’ (Toff & Palmer, 2019), as it demon-
strated significant differences in how women and men
find and consume news (Fortunati et al., 2014; Lee,
2013): While women might be more interested in news
connected with issues in daily life, men would be more
likely to access political news (Poindexter & Harp, 2008;
Rosentiel, 2008). Furthermore, it seems that these differ-
ences in news consumption originate from patterns of
news avoidance (Toff & Palmer, 2019). Hence, we believe
it was important to seewhether these patterns are repro-
duced in fake news reception. However, the results show
that politics-related fake contents are themost common,
and that in line with this, perhaps unsurprisingly, politics
is, for both men and women, the main topic of the false
news they identify. In general, men and women receive
false news on similar topics, although politics is clearly
the most frequent and the only topic in which significant
differences between genders are observed. As we have
already seen in earlier literature (AIMC, 2020) men tend
to consumemore information thanwomen and aremore
interested in politics. Nevertheless, this is not reflected
in a greater ability of men to identify false news, where
men and women have the same difficulties.
This research highlights that men, with a greater
interest in politics and a greater consumption of news
media, have the same difficulties as women in detecting
fake news and that this news is on the same topics as
women. The greater interest in politics could explain the
higher percentage of politics as the first topic mentioned
bymen. Nationalism also comes into play when the accu-
mulated three topics are considered, this relevance can
be explained by the current Catalan-Spanish conflict.
To sum up, previous research has confirmed that
men and women exhibit different behavior in relation
to news media use, have different interests with regard
to news topics, and different social media use. However,
the results of this research show that there are no sig-
nificant gender differences with regard to the ability to
detect fake news.Women aremore concerned thanmen,
but both have the same problems when facing disinfor-
mation content, which has become a widespread global
phenomenon today.
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